Evaluating Wright and Noonan's Externalist Arguments against Skepticism

Document Type : Original Research

Author
H. Alaeinejad
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
10.58209/jpt.2.2.105
Abstract
Putnam argues that accepting semantic externalism would require refuting the brains-in-a-vat skeptical hypothesis, and as a result, the skeptic will not succeed in proving her claim. Putnam's argument, however, is epistemically circular and inconclusive. The present article is devoted to evaluating Wright and Noonan's attempt to provide a plausible version of Putnam's argument. Based on the evaluation of these arguments, it was determined that (1) Wright and Noonan's arguments can at best only show that I am not a brain in a vat, but without the use of any auxiliary premises, they can not prove that we are not brains in a vat; (2) Contrary to Wright's claim, this premise of his argument that In BIVese, “brain-in-a-vat” does not refer to brains-in-a-vat, and its result, that is, that my language is not BIVese, lead his argument to be epistemically circular; and (3) Noonan's attempt to avoid epistemic circularity has not led to the desired result, and his argument, like Wright's, is epistemically circular.

Keywords

  1. Alaeinejad, H., (2018), “Brueckner's Simple Argument against Skepticism about the External World,” Metaphysics, Vol. 10, No. 25, pp. 77-92. Doi: 10.22108/mph.2018.107785.1066. [Persian]
    Alaeinejad, H., (2019), “Examining the Possibility of Refuting Philosophical Skepticism by Accepting Semantic Externalism,” Wisdom And Philosophy, Vol. 15, No. 60, pp. 159-183. Doi: 10.22054/wph.2020.43549.1736. [Persian]
    Alaeinejad, H., Hodjati, S. M. A., (2016), “The Critical Analysis of Davies’ Interpretation of Putnam’s Externalist Argument against Skepticism,” Philosophy and Kalam, Vol. 49, No. 1, 75-96. doi: 10.22059/jitp.2016.58364. [Persian]
    Brueckner, A., (1986), “Brains in a Vat”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 148-167.
    Brueckner, A., (1999), “Semantic Answer to Skepticism”, in Skepticism, a Contemporary Reader, Edited by Keith Derose and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 43-60, New York: Oxford University Press.
    Johnsen, B., C., (2003), “Of Brains in Vats, Whatever Brains in Vats May Be”, Philosophical Studies, Vol 112, pp. 225-249, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Kallestrup, J., (2012), Semantic Externalism, New York: Routledge.
    McKinsey, Michael, (2018), "Skepticism and Content Externalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/skepticism-content-externalism/>.
    Noonan, H., W., (1998), “Reflections on Putnam, Wright and Brains in Vats”, Analysis, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 59-62.
    Noonan, H., W., (2000), “Reply to Sawyer on brains in vats,” Analysis, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 247-49.
    Noonan, H., W., (2016), “Additional Reflections on Putnam, Wright and Brains in Vats”, Metaphysica, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 207-212.
    Putnam, H., (1981), Brains in a Vat, in Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Sawyer, S., (1999), “My Language Disquotes”, Analysis, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 206-211.
    Wright, C., (1992), “On Putnam’s Proof That We Are Not Brains-in-a-Vat”, Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 92, pp. 67-94.
  2. Alaeinejad H (2018). Brueckner's Simple Argument against Skepticism about the external world. Metaphysics. 10(25):77-92. [Persian] [Link]
  3. Alaeinejad H (2019). Examining the Possibility of Refuting Philosophical Skepticism by Accepting Semantic Externalism. Wisdom And Philosophy. 15(60):159-183. [Persian] [Link]
  4. Alaeinejad H, Hodjati SMA (2016). The critical analysis of Davies' interpretation of Putnam's externalist argument against skepticism. Philosophy and Kalam. 49(1):75-96. [Persian] [Link]
  5. Berdo CJ (2003). Of brains in vats, whatever brains in vats may be. Philosophical Studies. 112(3):225-249. [Link]
  6. Brueckner AL (1986). Brains in a vat. Journal of Philosophy. 83(3):148-167. [Link] [DOI:10.2307/2026572]
  7. Brueckner AL (1999). Semantic answers to skepticism. In: de Rose K, Warfield TA, editors. Skepticism, a contemporary reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 43-59. [Link]
  8. Kallestrup J (2012). Semantic externalism. London: Routledge. [Link] [DOI:10.4324/9780203830024]
  9. McKinsey M (2018). Skepticism and content externalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. May. [Link]
  10. Noonan HW (1998). Reflections on Putnam, Wright and brains in vats. Analysis. 58(1):59-62. [Link] [DOI:10.1111/1467-8284.00103]
  11. Noonan HW (2000). Reply to sawyer on brains in vats. Analysis. 60(3):247-249. [Link] [DOI:10.1093/analys/60.3.247]
  12. Noonan HW (2016). Additional reflections on Putnam, wright and brains in vats. Metaphysica. 17(2):207-212. [Link] [DOI:10.1515/mp-2016-0016]
  13. Putnam H (1981). Reason, truth and history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Link] [DOI:10.1017/CBO9780511625398]
  14. Sawyer S (1999). My language disquotes. Analysis. 59(3):206-211. [Link] [DOI:10.1093/analys/59.3.206]
  15. Wright C (1992). On Putnam's proof that we are not brains-in-a-vat. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 92(1):67-94. [Link] [DOI:10.1093/aristotelian/92.1.67]
Philosophical Thought
Volume 2, Issue 2 - Serial Number 6
Autumn 2022
Pages 105-119