My problem in this article is to examine the point of view of Browne, Rypka, Levy, and Arberry, who consider Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī to be an immoral traitor. By philosophical analysis and adopting an epistemological approach, I show that his historical argument has three major flaws. First, some premises include value concepts/judgments. Second, they have drawn a conclusion containing value concepts/judgments. Thirdly, the historical reports mentioned by them are not accurate and complete, nor are they considered in the context of that time, nor are they even mentioned with regard to the entire works and life of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. A historical look leads us to the conclusion that presenting such a view of has two main reasons. First, until 1968, many and detailed researches about Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and his history and era had not been done. Second, not only Tūsī is a complex and interesting character, but also the time and events of his period.
Adamson, P. (2016). “A Man for all Seasons−Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī” in A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps Volume 3: Philosophy in the Islamic World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Arberry, A. J. (1958). Classical Persian Literature. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
Arefi, Abbas. (2020). “Is/Ought Problem according to Allameh Mesbah Yazdi”. Journal of the Socio-Political Thought of Islam. 2(1): 25-43.
Browne. E. G. (1951). A Literary History of Persia Volume 2: From Firdawsī to Sa‘dī. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. PP. 457-459.
Dabashi, Hamid. (1996a). “The Philosopher/Vizier: Khwajā Nasir Al-Din Al-Tusi and Ismáilis” in Medieval Ismaili History and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. PP. 231-245.
Dabashi, Hamid. (1996b). “Khwajah Nasir Al-Din Al-Tusi: The Philosopher/Vizier and the Intellectual Climate of His Times” in History of Islamic Philosophy Edited by S. H. Nasr and O. Leaman. London And New York: Routledge. PP. 527-584.
Di Lucia, Paolo & Fittipaldi, Edoardo. (2021). Revisiting Searle on Deriving “Ought” from “Is”. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
Green, Christopher R. (2008). “Epistemology of Testimony”. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. URL = https://iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/.
Hare, R. M. (1963). Freedom and reason. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
Kosso, Peter. (2009). “Philosophy of Historiography” in A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography ed. Aviezer Tucker. US: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Leonard, Nick. (2023). “Epistemological Problems of Testimony”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/testimony-episprob/>.
Levy, Reuben. (1923). Persian Literature. London: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in 1923, 1936, 1945.
Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. NY: Penguin.
Mesbah Yazdi, Mohammad Taghi. (1372). Philosophical Instructions Volume One. Tehran: Islamic Propaganda Organization. [Persian]
Mesbah Yazdi, Mohammad Taghi. (1391). The Philosophy of Morality. Tehran: International. [Persian]
Motavalli, Morteza. (2023). Suhrawardī on the Quiddity and Epistemological Credibility of Religious Experience: An Account, Analysis, and Criticism [Doctoral Dissertation]. [Persian]
Mudarres Razavi, Muhammad Taghi. (1354). Aḥwal va Athar Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. Tehran: Culture Foundation of Iran. [Persian]
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. (1335). Āghāz va Anjām [Origin and Destination]. Edited by Īraj Afshār. Tehran: University of Tehran. [Persian]
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. (2004). Maṣāri‘ al-muṣāri‘ [Downfalls of the Wrestler]. Edited by Wilfred Madelung. Tehran: The Institute of Islamic Studies University of Tehran - McGill University. [Arabic]
Rypka, Jan. (1968). History of Iranian Literature. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Wickens, G. M. (2011). The Nasirean Ethics. English Translation. USA and Canada: Routledge.
Adamson P (2016). A man for all seasons: Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. In: Philosophy in the Islamic world: A history of philosophy without any gaps, Volume 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Link]
Arberry AJ (1958). Classical Persian Literature. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. [Link]
Arefi A (2021). Is/ought problem according to Allameh Mesbah Yazdi. Journal of the Socio-Political Thought of Islam. 2(1):25-43. [Link]
Browne EG (1951). A literary history of Persia, Volume 2: From Firdawsī to Sa'dī. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Link]
Dabashi H (1996a). The philosopher/vizier: Khwajā Nasir Al-Din Al-Tusi and Ismáilis. In: Medieval Ismaili history and thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 231-245. [Link]
Dabashi H (1996b). Khwajah Nasir Al-Din Al-Tusi: The philosopher/vizier and the intellectual climate of his times. In: The history of Islamic philosophy. London: Routledge. p. 527-584. [Link] [DOI:10.1201/9781003070733-39]
Di Lucia P, Fittipaldi E (2021). Revisiting Searle on deriving "Ought" from "Is". Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. [Link] [DOI:10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3]
Green CR (2008). Epistemology of testimony. Stanford: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [Link]
Hare RM (1963). Freedom and reason. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. [Link]
Kosso P (2009). Philosophy of historiography. In: A companion to the philosophy of history and historiography. Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. [Link] [DOI:10.1002/9781444304916.ch2]
Leonard N (2021). Epistemological problems of testimony. Stanford: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [Link]
Levy R (1923). Persian literature. London: Oxford University Press. [Link]
Mackie JL (1977). Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. New York: Penguin. [Link]
Mesbah Yazdi MT (2012). The philosophy of morality. Tehran: BEYNOLMELAL. [Persian] [Link]
Motavalli M (2023). Suhrawardī on the quiddity and epistemological credibility of religious experience: An account, analysis, and criticism [dissertation]. Tehran: University of Tehran. [Persian] [Link]
Mudarres Razavi MT (1975). AḤWAL VA ATHAR NAṢĪR AL-DĪN AL-ṬŪSĪ. Tehran: Culture Foundation of Iran. [Persian] [Link]
Tusi ND (1956). Origin and destination. Afshār I, editor. Tehran: University of Tehran. [Persian] [Link]
Tusi ND (2004). Downfalls of the wrestler. Madelung W, editor. Tehran: The Institute of Islamic Studies University of Tehran-McGill University. [Arabic] [Link]
Motavalli,M. (2025). Moral Judgement about Naṣīr al-DÄ«n al-á¹Å«sÄ«; Revisiting History from the Perspective of an Epistemologist. Philosophical Thought, 5(2), 155-163. doi: 10.58209/jpt.5.2.155
MLA
Motavalli,M. . "Moral Judgement about Naṣīr al-DÄ«n al-á¹Å«sÄ«; Revisiting History from the Perspective of an Epistemologist", Philosophical Thought, 5, 2, 2025, 155-163. doi: 10.58209/jpt.5.2.155
HARVARD
Motavalli M. (2025). 'Moral Judgement about Naṣīr al-DÄ«n al-á¹Å«sÄ«; Revisiting History from the Perspective of an Epistemologist', Philosophical Thought, 5(2), pp. 155-163. doi: 10.58209/jpt.5.2.155
CHICAGO
M. Motavalli, "Moral Judgement about Naṣīr al-DÄ«n al-á¹Å«sÄ«; Revisiting History from the Perspective of an Epistemologist," Philosophical Thought, 5 2 (2025): 155-163, doi: 10.58209/jpt.5.2.155
VANCOUVER
Motavalli M. Moral Judgement about Naṣīr al-DÄ«n al-á¹Å«sÄ«; Revisiting History from the Perspective of an Epistemologist. Philosophical Thought, 2025; 5(2): 155-163. doi: 10.58209/jpt.5.2.155
Philosophical Thought