Frege on Sense: More Investigation

Document Type : Original Research

Author
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
Frege doesn’t have an independent and comprehensive issue concerning indexical semantics. However, in some of his works, especially “The Thought”, he has declared some characteristics of some indexical. In sum, his view is that if a sentence contains an indexical word, it has linguistic meaning; However, it does not express a Thought (=sense) unless the reference of that indexical word is determined. Regarding Frege’s views concerning the characteristics of Thought, it seems his approach to the semantic of indexical can be extended to be true concerning other expressions having concrete references. To obtain a thought, all temporal and spatial constraints should be considered. Hence, we may claim that Frege considers all expressions with concrete references indexical.

Keywords


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