The Epistemology of Disagreement; Epistemic Symmetry, Religious Experience and Alternative Explanation

Document Type : Original Research

Authors
J. Abdollahi
S.A. Taheri Khurramabadi
Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
10.58209/jpt.3.2.89
Abstract
According to conciliationist (reductionist) argumentations in epistemology of disagreement, disagreement with an epistemic peer, due to epistemic symmetry, reduces the confidence in the justification. But many religious believers are not willing to take the existence of epistemic peer disagreement. They think that they have different evidence for their religious beliefs and, hence, aren’t really epistemic peers with their opponents. They present private evidence, especially religious experiences, as a symmetry breaker. For this reason, some reductionists have argued to defend the reductionist position. In this article, we examine the responses of the reductionists to this challenge. In one of these answers, it is added an “alternative explanation or story” to the conditions of epistemic peer and claimed that the true epistemic peer under full disclosure should takes into account private evidences or experiences and gives a good story or explanation about why such experiences aren’t as efficacious as the religious person might think. We show that the “alternative explanation” presented by reductionists is not readily available in the most of the religious disagreements.

Keywords

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