Critique of the Negation of Relativism by Appealing to Observation

Author
J. Abdollahi
Institute for the History of Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
10.58209/jpt.5.2.257
Abstract
In the traditional debate between epistemic absolutists and relativists, the main issue is whether there are neutral and absolute criteria for selecting epistemic systems or whether such criteria are dependent on socio-cultural contexts. Absolutists consider empirical evidence as a neutral and absolute criterion, while relativists, emphasizing the theory-ladenness of observation and underdetermination, argue that theoretical presuppositions and thus non-absolute always influence observation. Recently, David Stump, by proposing a pragmatic stance as a third position, rejects both relativism and absolutism. He uses observation as an objective but non-absolute criterion to refute relativism. However, Shahram Shahriari demonstrates that Stump's third position cannot exist. We, by examining the debate between Stump and Shahriari, show that observation, as Stump envisions it, cannot provide sufficient grounds to refute relativism.

Keywords

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Philosophical Thought
Volume 5, Issue 2 - Serial Number 18
Winter 2025
Pages 257-276