نقدی بر نفی نسبی‌گرایی با توسل به مشاهده

نویسنده
جلال عبدالهی
پژوهشکده تاریخ علم، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران
10.58209/jpt.5.2.257
چکیده
در مناقشه سنتی بین مطلق‌گرایان و نسبی‌گرایان معرفتی، مساله اصلی این است که آیا معیارهای خنثی و مطلق برای انتخاب سیستم‌های معرفتی وجود دارند یا معیارها وابسته به زمینه‌های اجتماعی-فرهنگی هستند. مطلق‌گرایان شواهد تجربی را معیاری خنثی و مطلق می‌دانند، در حالی که نسبی‌گرایان با تاکید بر نظریه‌باری مشاهده و تعین‌ناقص، استدلال می‌کنند که مشاهده همواره تحت تاثیر پیش‌فرض‌های نظری و لذا غیرمطلق است. اخیراً، دیوید استامپ با طرح موضع پراگماتیستی به عنوان موضع سوم، هم نسبی‌گرایی و هم مطلق‌گرایی را نفی می‌کند. او از مشاهده به عنوان معیاری عینی اما غیرمطلق برای نفی نسبی‌گرایی استفاده می‌کند. با این حال، شهرام شهریاری نشان می‌دهد که موضع سوم استامپ نمی‌تواند وجود داشته باشد. من، ضمن بررسی مناقشه استامپ و شهریاری، نشان می‌دهم که مشاهده، آن‌گونه که مد نظر استامپ است، نمی‌تواند برای نفی نسبی‌گرایی کفایت لازم را داشته باشد.

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