Di Bello on Smith's Solution to the Proof Paradoxes

Document Type : Original Research

Authors
S.M.M. Etemadoleslami Bakhtiari
M.R. Hezareh
Department of Science and Technology Studies, Faculty of Management, Science and Technology, Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
10.58209/jpt.5.1.81
Abstract
Proof paradoxes refer to situations where statistical evidence indicates that a suspect is the perpetrator, yet a conviction based solely on this evidence appears counterintuitive. The prevailing approach to addressing proof paradoxes involves establishing a criterion for distinguishing naked statistical evidence from other types of evidence. Smith introduces normic support as a criterion for the aforementioned distinction. Conversely, Di Bello proposes a modified version of normic support, arguing that the absence of access to undercutting defeaters in naked statistical evidence distinguishes it from other forms of evidence. In this research, we argue, in line with Pollock's perspective, that undercutting defeaters can still be accessed in the context of naked statistical evidence. Furthermore, by focusing on an example of proof paradoxes and drawing on Pollock's arguments - illustrated quantitatively by the base rate fallacy - we demonstrate the effectiveness of undercutting defeaters. Consequently, Di Bello's argument appears to be questionable.

Keywords

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