Unity Problems and the Nature of Proposition

Document Type : Original Research

Authors
H. Hamtaii
S.M.A. Hodjati
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Human Sciences, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
10.58209/jpt.4.3.235
Abstract
We will argue against formulating the propositional unity as a problem of Order, Combinability, or Recognition. We find the issue of Representation surprisingly biased to the Correspondence theory of truth, and we show how wrong it may be to read the question of having truth conditions as a question of truth conditions itself. Finally, we demonstrate how certain structured propositions may escape the arms of the question of unity. We find the problem of having truth conditions to be the most to-the-point question of the nature of propositions.

Keywords

  1. Candlish, S. (2007). The Russell/Bradley Dispute and its Significance for Twentieth Century Philosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Davidson, D. (2005). Truth and Predication. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Eklund, M. (2019). Regress, unity, facts, and propositions. Synthese. 196 (4):1225-1247.
    Frege, G. (1952). Function and Concept. in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, tr. P. Geach and M. Black, Philosophical Library, New York.
    Gaskin, R. (2008). The Unity of the Proposition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Gilmore, C. (2022). Why 0-adic Relations Have Truth Conditions: Essence, Ground, and Non-Hylomorphic Russellian Propositions. In Tillman C. & Murray A. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. London: Routledge. pp. 304 – 319.
    Hylton, P. (1984). The nature of the proposition and the revolt against idealism. In R. Richard, J. B. Schneewind, & Q. Skinner (Eds.), Philosophy in history: Essays on the historiography of philosophy (pp. 97–375). New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Jespersen, B. (2019). Anatomy of a proposition. Synthese 196, 1285–1324.
    Keller, L. J. (2013). The metaphysics of propositional constituency. The Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Essays on the Nature of Propositions, 43, 655–678.
    King, J. C. (2009). Questions of Unity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 109, 257–277.
    King, J.C. (2019). On propositions and fineness of grain (again!). Synthese 196, 1343–1367.
    King, J. C. (2013). Propositional unity: what’s the problem, who has it and who solves it?. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):71-93.
    Levy, A. (1979). Basic Set Theory. Springer.
    Orilia, F. (2007). Bradley’s Regress: Meinong versus Bergmann. In Laird Addis, Greg Jesson & Erwin Tegtmeier (eds.), Ontology and Analysis: Essays and Recollection about Gustav Bergmann. De Gruyter. pp. 133-164.
    Pelletier, F. J., & Zalta, E. N., (2000). How to say goodbye to the third man. Noûs 34 (2):165–202.
    Pickel, B., (2019). Unity through truth. Synthese 196 (4):1425-1452.
    Romero-Figueroa, A., (1985). OSV as the basic order in Warao. Lingua. 66 (2–3): 115–134.
    Russell, B. (1899). The Classification of Relations, in Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 2, London, Unwin Hyman, 1990, pp. 136-46.
    Russell, B., (2010). [First published 1903]. Principles of Mathematics. Routledge.
    Russell, B., (2001). [First published 1912]. Truth and Falsehood. In The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp 69-75.
    Sainsbury, M., (1996). How can some thing say something? Reprinted in Departing From Frege, Oxford: Routledge (2002).
    Soames, S., (2014). Why the traditional conceptions of propositions can't be correct?. In Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames & Jeff Speaks (eds.), New Thinking About Propositions. Oxford University Press.
    Soames, S., (2010). What is Meaning?. Princeton University Press.
    Speaks, J., (2020). Cognitive Acts and the Unity of the Proposition. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):646-660.
    Wittgenstein, L. (1961), Notebooks, 1914–1916, G.E.M. Anscombe (trans), Harper and Row, New York.
  2. Candlish S (2007). The Russell/Bradley dispute and its significance for twentieth-century philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. [Link] [DOI:10.1057/9780230800618]
  3. Davidson D (2005). Truth and predication. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [Link] [DOI:10.4159/9780674030220]
  4. Eklund M (2019). Regress, unity, facts, and propositions. Synthese. 196(4):1225-1247. [Link] [DOI:10.1007/s11229-016-1155-4]
  5. Frege G (1952). Function and concept. In: Geach PT, Black M, editors. Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege. Hoboken: Blackwell Publishers. [Link]
  6. Gaskin R (2008). The unity of the proposition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Link] [DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239450.001.0001]
  7. Gilmore C (2022). Why 0-adic relations have truth conditions: Essence, ground, and non-hylomorphic russellian propositions. In: Tillman C, Murray A, editors. The Routledge handbook of propositions. London: Routledge. p. 304-319. [Link] [DOI:10.4324/9781315270500-22]
  8. Hylton P (1984). The nature of the proposition and the revolt against idealism. In: Rorty R, Schneewind JB, Skinner Q, editors. Philosophy in history: Essays on the historiography of philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 375-398. [Link] [DOI:10.1017/CBO9780511625534.019]
  9. Jespersen B (2019). Anatomy of a proposition. Synthese. 196(4):1285-1324. [Link] [DOI:10.1007/s11229-017-1512-y]
  10. Keller L (2013). The metaphysics of propositional constituency. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 43(5/6):655-678. [Link] [DOI:10.1080/00455091.2013.870735]
  11. King JC (2009). Questions of unity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 109(1):257-277. [Link] [DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00267.x]
  12. King JC (2013). Propositional unity: What's the problem, who has it and who solves it?. Philosophical Studies. 165(1):71-93. [Link] [DOI:10.1007/s11098-012-9920-9]
  13. King JC (2019). On propositions and fineness of grain (again!). Synthese. 196(4):1343-1367. [Link] [DOI:10.1007/s11229-016-1291-x]
  14. Levy A (1979). Basic set theory (perspectives in mathematical logic). Berlin: Springer Verlag. [Link] [DOI:10.1007/978-3-662-02308-2]
  15. Orilia F (2007). Bradley's regress: Meinong versus bergmann. In: Addisc L, Jesson G, Tegtmeier E, editors. Ontology and analysis: Essays and recollection about Gustav Bergmann. Berlin: De Gruyter. p. 133-164. [Link] [DOI:10.1515/9783110327038.133]
  16. Pelletier FJ, Zalta EN (2000). How to say goodbye to the third man. Noûs. 34(2):165-202. [Link] [DOI:10.1111/0029-4624.00207]
  17. Pickel B (2019). Unity through truth. Synthese. 196(4):1425-1452. [Link] [DOI:10.1007/s11229-016-1279-6]
  18. Romero-Figueroa A (1985). OSV as the basic order in Warao. Lingua. 66(2-3):115-134. [Link] [DOI:10.1016/S0024-3841(85)90281-5]
  19. Russell B (1899). The classification of relations. In: Griffin N, Lewis AC, editors. The collected papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 2. London: Routledge. p. 136-146. [Link] [DOI:10.4324/9781003557319-17]
  20. Russell B (1903). Principles of mathematics. London: Routledge. [Link]
  21. Russell B (1912). Truth and falsehood. In: The problems of philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 69-75. [Link]
  22. Sainsbury M (1996). How can some thing say something?. In: Departing from Frege. London: Routledge. [Link]
  23. Soames S (2010). What is meaning?. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Link] [DOI:10.1515/9781400833948]
  24. Soames S (2014). Why the traditional conceptions of propositions can't be correct?. In: King JC, Soames S, Speaks J, editors. New thinking about propositions. New York: Oxford University Press. [Link] [DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693764.003.0003]
  25. Speaks J (2020). Cognitive acts and the unity of the proposition. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 98(4):646-660. [Link] [DOI:10.1080/00048402.2019.1686530]
  26. Wittgenstein L (1961). Notebooks, 1914-1916. Von Wright GH, Anscombe GEM, editors. New York: Harper and Row. [Link]
Philosophical Thought
Volume 4, Issue 3 - Serial Number 15
Autumn 2024
Pages 235-251