مسئولیت معرفتی از منظر جان هیل

نوع مقاله : پژوهشی اصیل

نویسندگان
فاطمه عرب گورچوئی 1
زهرا خزاعی 2
محسن جوادی 3
1 گروه آموزشی معارف اسلامی، دانشکده حقوق و الهیات، دانشگاه شهید باهنر، کرمان، ایران
2 گروه ﻓﻠﺴﻔﻪ و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه ﻗﻢ، ﻗﻢ، ایران
3 گروه فلسفه اخلاق، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه ﻗﻢ، ﻗﻢ، ایران
10.58209/jpt.4.2.141
چکیده
جان هیل با قبول نقش اراده در پذیرش و شکل‌گیری، و حفظ و به‌کارگیری روش‌های مولد باور، بر مسئولیت انسان در برابر باورها تاکید دارد. با وجود دفاع هیل از اراده‌باوری غیرمستقیم، وی سیری تشکیکی از مستقیم و بی‌واسطه‌بودن نقش اراده در روش کسب باور و حفظ باور تا غیرمستقیم و باواسطه‌بودن تاثیر آن در پذیرش و کسب باور را دنبال می‌کند. هیل در شکل‌دهی باورها، اراده‌باوری مستقیم را که مبتنی بر تصور مشهور دکارتی است نمی‌پذیرد؛ اما با تفکیک میان اراده‌باوری مستقیم و غیرمستقیم، شرح مفهوم فعل پایه و غیرپایه و بیان روش‌ها و تکنیک‌هایی همچون تغییر رفتاری، تلاش می‌کند پذیرش و شکل‌دهی باورها را نیز تحت کنترل ارادی اما غیرمستقیم افراد تفسیر کند. در این پژوهش با به‌کارگیری روش تحلیلی-انتقادی برآنیم تا نشان دهیم با اصلاح و تعدیل دیدگاه هیل، پذیرش مسئولیت معرفتی بر اساس دیدگاه اراده‌باوری غیرمستقیم معنادار است.

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اندیشه فلسفی
دوره 4، شماره 2 - شماره پیاپی 14
تابستان 1403
صفحه 141-159