ظاهراً طبیعی است که فکر کنیم دهقان فداکار کاری فراتر از وظیفه خود انجام داده است. اما این حکم نیاز به توضیح دارد. چطور برای کاری دلایل زیادی هست و به همین سبب ستودنی است، اما وظیفه محسوب نمیشود؟ بحث از فراوظیفه با این سوال آغاز میشود اما دامنهدارتر از آن است. در این یادداشت به بعضی ابعاد این موضوع اشاره میکنم. در این حین، به «تفسیر احتیاطی فراوظیفه» اشاره میکنم که اخیراً در مقالهای بر اساس پیشنهادی از مسکویه ارایه شده است. بدین ترتیب، در این یادداشت به این میپردازم که با موضوعی مهم و منابعی مغفول روبهرو هستیم.
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