مقایسه معرفت‌شناختی اختلاف نظر معقول نزد کوهن و فایرابند

نوع مقاله : پژوهشی اصیل

نویسنده
جلال عبدالهی
گروه فلسفه علم، دانشگاه صنعتی شریف، تهران، ایران
10.58209/jpt.3.4.357
چکیده
در مقاله ­پیش­رو می­خواهم این پرسش­ها را بررسی کنم که اختلاف­نظر معقول در علم، چه ویژگی­ها و توجیهاتی می­تواند داشته باشد؟ دلایل توجیه اختلاف نظر معقول در علم چه ارتباطی با دلایل توجیه اختلاف نظر معقول در معرفت­شناسی اختلاف نظر، به‌خصوص معرفت‌شناسی اختلاف نظر دینی، دارد؟ در این راستا، به صورت خاص، روی دیدگاه­های دو فیلسوف علم نامدار نیمه دوم قرن بیستم، یعنی توماس کوهن و پل فایرابند متمرکز می­شوم. از نظر من، تلقی‌های این دو فیلسوف در مورد اختلاف نظر معقول در علم، می‌تواند مثال­های قابل تامل و انضمامی باشند از رویکرد­های عمده­ در معرفت­شناسی اختلاف نظر (دینی)، که در آنها سعی می‌شود اختلاف نظر معقول را توجیه کنند. نشان می­دهم که تلقی کوهن از اختلاف نظر در علم، می­تواند درک شهودی ما از اختلاف نظر معقول در معرفت­شناسی را بهبود ببخشد؛ همچنین، استدلالی اقامه خواهم کرد که برابر مفاد آن، تلقی تکثرگرایانه فایرابند از اختلاف نظر معقول را با چالشی (معرفتی) روبه‌رو می‌کند که از خود اختلاف نظر سرچشمه می­گیرد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

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