دخالت ارزشهای غیرمعرفتی در استدلال علمی بحثهای زیادی به همراه داشته است. یکی از راههایی که میتواند این دخالت را توجیه نماید، استدلال از راه ریسک استقرائی است. هدف این مقاله، بررسی نسخهای از این استدلال است که توسط داگلاس ارائه میگردد. وی با طرح پرسش در مورد «حد کفایت شواهد» استدلالش را پیش میبرد. ما با مفروض گرفتن درستی استدلال داگلاس، سعی میکنیم که پاسخ پرسش از «حدکفایت شواهد» را با توجه نتیجهگیری استدلالش مشخص سازیم. نشان خواهیم داد که با درنظرگرفتن توأمان ارزشهای معرفتی و غیرمعرفتی نمیتوان پاسخ مناسبی برای حدکفایت بهدست آورید، زیرا یا گرفتار دور میشویم و یا مجبور به اضافه کردن اموری مبهم. همچنین، توضیح خواهیم داد که داگلاس میتوانست پاسخ به پرسش از حد کفایت را با تاکید بیشتر بر عمل دانشمندان و کاربران واقعی علم جستوجو کند که در آن، الزامی بر ادغام مدعیات علمی با حیطههای سیاستگذارانه علم وجود ندارد.
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