In this note, I argue that Fine's pure logic of ground is nothing but the structural fragment of RM. This result raises a problem for discriminating between ground and relevantistic deduction in Fine's theory of ground.
Anderson A. R., Belnap N.D. (1975). Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, vol.1, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Fine, K. (1994). Essence and Modality. Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 8, Logic and Language, pp. 1-16
Fine, K. (2012a). The pure logic of ground. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 5(1), 1–25.
Fine, K. (2012b). Guide to ground. In F. Correia & B. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical grounding. Cambridge University Press, pp. 37–80
Rosen, G. (2010). Metaphysical dependence: Grounding and reduction. In Hale, B., and Hoffmann, A., editors. Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 109–136.
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