One of the most important issues in the reference section of the philosophy of language is the sense of the proper names. Two main figures in this discussion are Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege and John Stuart Mill. Frege has posed several puzzles against Mill's view. One of the puzzles is the puzzle of the belief context. the puzzle of the belief context implies that Mill's view of proper names is incorrect because it entails an account of the Substitution Principle (S) which is the origin of contradiction in the belief context. (S) is accounted in two ways. Frege shows in his puzzle that S1 is responsible for contradiction in belief context. Since Mill’s view entails S1, it is responsible for contradiction. But if Frege’s view of proper names is accepted, since the referent of proper names in belief context is identical with the sense of proper name in ordinal context, S2 which is more intuitive than S1 is not violated in any context. Kripke, a prominent advocate of Millie's view, shows the puzzle of the belief context can be reproduced even if Frege's view of the sense of the proper names is accepted. He designs his first puzzle by two intuitionally true principles (Disquotation and Translation), and designs his second puzzle by only Disquotation Principle. David Sosa, a proponent of Frege's view, claims that He has been able to revive Frege's puzzle against Mill, which Kripke believes he was able to neutralize with two similar puzzles. On his opinion, intuitionally true Hermeneutic principle is violated in the context of belief only if Millian view is accepted. In this paper, after explaining Sosa's proposal, a concern have been proposed about it. The concern is related to the analytical nature of line 7 of Frege’s puzzle, line of 8 of Kripke’s first puzzle, and line of 7 of Kripke’s second puzzle. Sosa believes that these lines are analytic. Nevertheless, according to the scenario of puzzles, being analytic of these lines is not clear. Because of this unclarity, Steinberg claims that these lines are responsible for contradiction.
Frege, Gottlob. ‘On Sense and Reference’. Zeithschrift fur Philosphie und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1892): 25–50. Reprinted in A. P. Martinich, ed. The Philosophy of Language. New York, NY: Oxford UP, 1996. 186–198.
Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Semantics of Natural Language. Eds Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972; Reprinted ed.: Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1980.
——. ‘A Puzzle about Belief’. Philosophical Troubles: collected papers. New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2011. 125–161.
Mill, John Stuart. ‘Of Names’. System of Logic (1881). Reprinted in A. P. Martinich, ed. The Philosophy of Language. New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2001. 266–71.
Sosa, David. 1996. "The Import of the Puzzle About Belief." The Philosophical Review 105: 373-402
Steinberg, Jesse. 2007. "Pierre may be ignorant, but he's not irrational." The Reasoner 1: 2-3.
Philosophical Thought